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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
The

state appeals

from the

district court’s

order granting

Sunny Dawn Riley’s motion

t0

suppress evidence.

Statement

Of The

On

And Course Of The Proceedings

Facts

January 12, 2018,

at 8:55 p.m.,

Ofﬁcer Kingland 0f the Boise Police Department

stopped Riley for driving With an expired registration.

OBVI,

00:59-01:01.)

license

Ofﬁcer Kingland asked

00:00-00:55.)

and

After

that

it

rummaging around

was

t0

(Kingland

expired.

did not have insurance. (Kingland

OBV,

(TL, p.1

1,

L.25 — p.12, L.10; Kingland

for Riley’s driver’s license.

ﬁnd

it,

OBV,

(Kingland

Riley told the ofﬁcer she did not have her

01:02-01:36.) Riley additionally admitted she

02:1 1-2: 16.)

Riley was nervous. Ofﬁcer Kingland had to instruct her to calm down. (Kingland
01:22-01:23.)

Her responses

to

him were peppered with nervous

laughter.

(Kingland

01:17-01:23; 01:42-01:43; 02:50-02:55; 04:08-04:15.) The ofﬁcer later testiﬁed

[Riley’s] voice trembling

and

[her]

OBV,

that,

OBV,

OBV,

“based on

speaking quickly,” he suspected “possible drug usage,”

though he did not think “she was under the inﬂuence” “at that moment.” (TL, p.25, Ls.12-21.)
Speciﬁcally, his “observations

were consistent with somebody

that

was

either hiding

illicit

substances in the vehicle or trying t0 hide something else inside the car.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.14-20.)

1

Four ofﬁcer Videos were admitted into evidence

(TL, p.10, Ls.10-17.) Based on the record below
exhibit number.

“[Ofﬁcer Name]

(ﬂ

Tr., p.7; p.10,

OBV.”

Ls.13-16.)

at the

it is

hearing 0n Riley’s motion t0 suppress.

unclear Which Video corresponds t0 which

This brief will therefore refer those Videos by

Ofﬁcer Kingland asked

if

Riley had “anything 0n [her] that shows

provided her dental insurance card.

(Kingland

OBV,

02:43-02:59.)

Who you

are”; Riley

The ofﬁcer pulled a

notebook out 0f his pocket and started writing Riley’s information down While asking her about
prior arrest history, potential probation

4200.)

car

I

As

need

status,

and insurance. (Kingland

t0

worry about?”; and “N0 marijuana, drugs, pipes, anything crazy
at

and denied. (Kingland

Ofﬁcer Kingland explained
vehicle.” (Kingland

was “most

OBV,

OBV,

04203-0421

04:26-04:29.)

He

we

OBV,

5:06—05:12.)

Ofﬁcer

he was planning 0n citing Riley for “n0 proof of insurance,

failure t0

(Kingland

entered his vehicle at 15 seconds after 9:00 p.m. (Kingland

While Kingland was working 0n the
L.4.)

(TL, p.15, Ls.20-24.) Kingland

citations

OBV,

a conversation With Ofﬁcer Kingland,

Who was

later testiﬁed that

still

He

(T11, p.15, Ls.1-16.)

05:42.)

Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison arrived.

At 9:01 :22 pm. Ofﬁcer Miles got out 0f his

Ofﬁcer Kingland

on a

gotta have insurance

returned to his vehicle to “complete[] records checks and citations.”

— p.16,

Which

like that?”,

asked Riley t0 “hang out for me,” and told her she

purchase, 0r invalid driver’s license, and expired registration.”

00130.)

02:59-

1.)

to Riley that “Obviously,

likely” going t0 get “a couple citations.”

later testiﬁed that

p.15, L.25

OBV,

the ofﬁcer put the notebook back in his pocket, he asked Riley: “Nothing illegal in the

Riley laughed

Kingland

and parole

car and

sitting in his patrol car.

he “stop[ped] What

[he]

walked over
(Miles

t0

OBV,

(TL,

have
00: 1-

was doing”—that

is,

“writing the ticket”—t0 explain his concerns about Riley’s possible drug use t0 Ofﬁcers Miles

and

Ellison.

(TL, p.22, Ls.8-23.)

As Ofﬁcer Kingland put

it,

it

was “important

t0

inform

my

approaching ofﬁcers for ofﬁcer safety purposes what’s going 0n and What they’re walking into

and not walk

into there blindly.”

(T12, p.22,

Ls.12-15.)

Ofﬁcer Kingland also testiﬁed

that

asked Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison “t0 try t0 get” Riley’s “consent to search” her vehicle.

he

(TL,

p.25, L.22

—

p.26, L.1.)

None 0f

the ofﬁcers’ on-body Videos recorded audio during this

conversation; however, Ofﬁcer Miles’s Video showsz that the ofﬁcers’ conversation lasted

approximately 20 seconds. (Miles

While Kingland wrote
conversation with Riley,

OBV,

Who

07:09-10:55; Miles

OBV,

00: 10-00230.)

citations,

Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison proceeded to have a

eventually stepped out of her car at the ofﬁcers’ request. (Kingland

OBV,

00:30-04:15.)

Ofﬁcer Lane arrived With a drug detection K-9.

(TL, p.15, Ls.5-10.) At 9:09:52 a.m., While Ofﬁcer Kingland

K—9

the

alerted

on Riley’s

vehicle. (Kingland

OBV,

15: 19;

was

still

writing Riley’s citations,

Lane OBV, 01 :41 .) Ofﬁcer Kingland

did “not complete writing information 0n” Riley’s citations until after the K—9 alerted, at

pm.

9:

10:40

(R., p.79.)

The ofﬁcers searched Riley’s vehicle and found a “baggie 0f methamphetamine and two
snort straws with suspected

methamphetamine residue.”

(R., p.57.)

Riley was subsequently

charged With possession of methamphetamine and possession 0f drug paraphernalia.

(R.,

pp.26-

27.)

Riley

moved

t0 suppress the evidence that

was found

in her car.

(R., pp.36, 42-53.)

She

argued that “Ofﬁcer Kingland unreasonably extended an otherwise-completed trafﬁc stop, to

conduct a dog
that

sniff,

Without reasonable articulable suspicion.” (R., p.44.) The state contended

“Ofﬁcer Kingland diligently worked on his

alerted

on Defendant’s vehicle,” and

p.61 (boldface 0mitted).)

2

The

The

citation during the time

as such, “did not

state additionally

Ofﬁcer Lane’s canine

abandon the purpose 0f the stop.”

(R.,

argued that Ofﬁcer Kingland “did not abandon

could not determine the length 0f the ofﬁcers’ conversation. (R.,
p.82.) This was clearly erroneous as shown by Miles’s on-body Video, as explained in section I.B
infra.

district court

found that

it

the purpose 0f the stop

there

was anything

by asking” Riley “about her probation

illegal in the vehicle.”

(R.,

p.62 (boldface 0mitted).)

Ofﬁcer Kingland’s questions “did not deviate from the original mission
Violation” and

state

were “ordinary inquiries related

whether

status, prior arrests, or

The

state

argued that

t0 investigate a trafﬁc

to safety concerns.” (R., p.65.) Alternatively, the

claimed that the questions “did not measurably extend the length of the trafﬁc stop.”

The

district court

held a hearing on Riley’s motion.

stipulated to admit all four ofﬁcers’

state called

The

on-body Videos

Ofﬁcers Kingland and Lane t0
district court

(E

generally Tr.)

The

into evidence (TL, p.10, Ls.7-17),

(Id.)

parties

and the

testify (TL, pp. 10-33).

granted Riley’s motion t0 suppress.

(R., pp.75-86.)

In

its

order

granting dismissal, the court noted that the “evidence consisted largely” of the ofﬁcers’ on-body

Videos,

which

it

found “speak for themselves.”

(R., p.75.)

The

district court also “articulate[d]

additional ﬁndings of fact” t0 describe the arguments “and the reasons for” the court’s decisions.

(Id.)

dog
its

Those

factual

ﬁndings included the court’s “agree[ment] with the State’s argument that the

alerted at [09:09:52 p.m.]” (R., p.79.)3

The court

also “agree[d] with the State’s assertion in

brieﬁng that” Ofﬁcer Kingland did “not complete writing information on the citation until

[9:10:40 p.m.]”

(Id.)

Turning t0 the merits, the

district court

agreed With the state that Ofﬁcer Kingland’s

questions about probation and prior arrests were proper—it found “those questions were

reasonably related t0 simply conﬁrming [Riley’s] identity” and, in any event, were asked “while

Ms. Riley was looking

3

As

for

some proof 0f her

the district court explained in footnote

Videos are

all

1

identity.”

(R., p.76.)

“Thus,” the court concluded,

of its opinion, the time codes shown in the on-body

“expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC),” as opposed t0 local time. (R.,

p.79, n. 1 .) For clarity this brief will refer t0 the timestamps converted t0 local time.

“even

if

unrelated t0 the purpose 0f the stop,” these questions “did not extend the duration 0f the

detention.” (Id.)

However, the court agreed With Riley that the questions about
“clearly unrelated to the trafﬁc stop.”

And

(R., p.77.)

it

illegal

rejected the state’s argument that these

questions “did not extend the duration of the stop because the ofﬁcer

notepad”

When he asked them.

(R., p.78.)

The court nevertheless found

ﬁnished writing Riley’s citations 48 seconds
caused by asking Ms. Riley questions about

after the

illegal

items in the car were

K-9

alerted, “the 8

was putting away

his

that because the ofﬁcer

second delay the ofﬁcer

items in the car did not extend the duration of

her detention.” (R., p.79.)

Turning t0 whether the conversation between Ofﬁcers Kingland and Miles measurably
extended the trafﬁc stop, the court ﬁrst found the ofﬁcer conversation was “not related t0 the
trafﬁc stop itself.”

(R., p.81.)

Based on

that, the court set

out What

it

thought was the relevant

inquiry:

As

discussed above, [Ofﬁcer Kingland] abandons the trafﬁc stop 48 seconds after

the

dog

alerts.

Eight 0f those seconds were used

questions about illegal items in her car.

Did

when he asked

[Ms.] Riley the

his conversation with the other

ofﬁcers take longer than 40 seconds? If so, then that conversation, along With his
questions about illegal items, extended the duration of her seizure.

(R., p.81.)

The

district court

concluded

it

could not determine

how

long the ofﬁcer conversation

lasted:

[Ofﬁcer Kingland]

was asked

several

conversation with the other ofﬁcers

Who

questions
arrived.

about the duration of his

Defense counsel asked

if

it

would surprise him that the conversation took about 2 minutes. The ofﬁcer said
he had no idea; he’d have t0 review his Video. The prosecutor asked him if that
conversation lasted longer than two minutes; he said he didn’t know; only that
he’d characterize

it

as “brief.”

(R., p.82.)

Based 0n

this,

the court found

it

could not “determine

if the

conversations” between

Kingland and Riley, and Kingland and the other ofﬁcers, “‘measurably extended’ the duration”
0f Riley’s seizure.

“Because they might have,” the court concluded that Riley was

(Id.)

unlawfully seized:

Here the ofﬁcer asked Ms. Riley questions about items

in her car that

were

unrelated t0 the purpose of the trafﬁc stop; a de [minimis] delay certainly, but also

measurable one.

He

also

delayed his trafﬁc investigation to engage in a

conversation with other ofﬁcers about his suspicions that she had used illegal

drugs

recently

and about them getting consent

to

search

her car.

That

conversation was not related t0 the purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop. The State bears the

burden 0f persuading

this court that those deviations

from the purpose 0f the stop

did not measurably extend the duration 0f Ms. Riley’s seizure; the State has failed
t0

d0 s0 here.

(R., p.84.)

“For [those] reasons,” the
p.85.)

The

state

district court

granted Riley’s motion to suppress evidence. (R.,

timely appealed. (R., pp.97-100.)

ISSUE
Did

the district court err

factual

by granting Riley’s motion

ﬁnding and an incorrect conclusion

to suppress

that the trafﬁc stop

based on a clearly erroneous

was unlawfully extended?

ARGUMENT
The

BV Granting Riley’s Motion T0 Suppress Based On A Clearly
Factual Finding And An Incorrect Conclusion That The Trafﬁc Stop Was Unlawﬁlllv

District

Erroneous

Court Erred

Extended
A.

Introduction

The

district court

granted suppression after concluding the state failed to

show

that

Ofﬁcer Kingland’s purported “deviations from the purpose of the stop did not measurably extend
the duration of Ms. Riley’s seizure.” (R., p.84.) This

First, the court’s

guess”

how

order

was premised 0n a

was

reversible error for

clearly erroneous factual

two reasons.

ﬁnding

long the conversation between Ofﬁcers Kingland and Miles lasted.

the contrary, that conversation can be seen

seconds. (Miles

OBV,

Second, the

district court erred

1)

when

it

T0

concluded that Ofﬁcer Kingland unlawfully

asking Riley if she had any illegal items while putting his citation

Neither action impermissibly extended or abandoned the trafﬁc stop.

an exercise in pause-counting, Which

2019

(R., p.82.)

on the ofﬁcers’ on—body Video and n0 longer than 20

notebook away; and 2) having the 20-second conversation With Ofﬁcer Miles.

is

could “only

00:10-00:30.)

prolonged the trafﬁc stop by

requirement and

it

is

“inimical t0 the Fourth

contrary to United State

WL 4050018, at *5 (Ct. App. 2019);

To conclude otherwise

is

Amendment’s reasonableness

Supreme Court precedent.”
State V.

(ﬂ R., p.84.)

McGraw, 163 Idaho

State V.

Still,

N0. 45792,

736, 741, 418 P.3d 1245,

1250 (2018). Because Ofﬁcer Kingland did not impermissibly extend or abandon the trafﬁc stop
the district court erred in granting suppression.

B.

Standard

The

Of Review

appellate court reviews the grant of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard.

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607,

389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016)

(Citing State V.

206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court Will accept the
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

However, the appellate court

Li. (citing

freely reviews

principles in light of the facts found. Li. (citing

C.

The

Court Clearly Erred

District

Conversation,

The

Which

district court’s

Is

m,

the

When

court’s

trial

w,
It

147 Idaho

147 Idaho

at

trial

Purdum, 147 Idaho
court’s ﬁndings of

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

application of constitutional

at

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

Determined The Length Of

An

Ofﬁcer

Shown On Video, Could Not Be Determined

order

was premised on

the timing 0f

two events involving Ofﬁcer

Kingland: his questions t0 Riley about illegal items, and his conversation With Ofﬁcer Miles.

The

district court correctly

Kingland

OBV,

found that the Riley questioning took eight seconds.

04:03-04:11.)

But the court mistakenly concluded

long the Ofﬁcer Miles conversation lasted because

The evidence regarding
sparse.

As

how

it

is

The

it

take?

between the ofﬁcers is
not contained 0n any of the Videos. The only

long that conversation took

The court can only

it

is

the testimony described

was

“brief.”

guess.

State has failed to persuade the court that the ofﬁcer’s conversation with the

responding ofﬁcers did not measurably extend the duration 0f Mr. Riley’s seizure.

The ofﬁcer who conducted

the stop

was asked

duration 0f his conversation with other ofﬁcers

several questions about the

who

arrived.

Defense counsel

if it would surprise him that the conversation took about 2 minutes. The
ofﬁcer said he had n0 idea; he’d have t0 review his Video. The prosecutor asked

asked

him

conversation lasted longer than two minutes; he said he didn’t know[,]
only that he’d characterize it as “brief.”
if that

how

was “not contained 0n any of the Videos”:

above: the ofﬁcer could not estimate the time but said

So how long did

could “only guess”

the length 0f that conversation

stated earlier,

testimony given about

it

it

(R., p.78;

(R.,

pp.81-82 (footnote 0mitted).)
This was a clear

body Video and

it

The conversation

error.

lasts—at

most—20

seconds.

in question

(Miles

can be seen on Ofﬁcer Miles’s 0n-

OBV,

00:10-00:30.)

needs to review the Video to see the conversation in question and see the
erred.

This Court simply

district court clearly

(Id.)

The

district court

was “not captured

in

ofﬁcer conversation

any of the Videos admitted.”

(R., p.79.)

that the conversation

was writing

It is

true that the audio

of the

not captured in the exhibit, because neither ofﬁcer was recording audio at

But the video 0f the ofﬁcer conversation can

that time.

afﬁrmed

is

mistakenly found otherwise, concluding that the ofﬁcer conversation

still

be clearly seen. Ofﬁcer Kingland

between himself and Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison occurred while he

citations, prior to the

K-9 ofﬁcer

arrived. (Tr., p.15, L.25

— p.16,

L.7.) This

can only

be a reference t0 00:10 through 00:30 0f Ofﬁcer Miles’s on-body Video, which shows Ofﬁcers
Miles and Ellison arriving and walking over t0 Kingland’s
car and Ofﬁcer

00:45.)

Lane

(the

K-9 ofﬁcer) has

yet to arrive.

car.

Ofﬁcer Kingland

(Miles

OBV,

is sitting

00:14-16; Lane

Even Without audio we know a conversation occurs here because we can

Watch

as he starts to talk to

the Video

ﬂame“ by frame; you can

4

T0 watch

we

OBV,

mouth moving

Ofﬁcer Miles. (Miles OBV, 00: 16-00: 17.)

Moreover, by coordinating the
ofﬁcers’ Videos,

see Ofﬁcer Kingland’s

OBV,

see Ofﬁcer

Miles walk over to Kingland’s car and lean into the open window t0 talk to him. (Miles
00:14-00:28.)

in his

UTC

timestamps 0n the upper right-hand corner 0f the

can see that Ofﬁcer Kingland’s Video matches up perfectly with

a Video frame

by frame

in

VLC Media Player “e” is the default hotkey.
10

this

being

the conversation.

Ofﬁcer Miles.

Kingland testiﬁed that he “stopped writing” the citation when he spoke with

(Tr., p.25,

you synchronize the

And

L22 — p.26,

L.

UTC timestamps.

a comparison of

all

1 .)

This

is

(Kingland

the Videos, synchronized

precisely

OBV,
by

Kingland

is

writing citations before the

K-9

alerts

OBV,

06:50-07: 10; Miles

UTC

point where the conversation could have occurred.

what Kingland’s Video shows When

timestamp, likewise shows no other

During the

(Kingland

rest

OBV,

0f the time that Ofﬁcer

07:1 1-16207), neither Ofﬁcer

Miles nor Ofﬁcer Ellison had a conversation With Ofﬁcer Kingland (Miles
Ellison

OBV,

00:10-00:30.)

OBV,

00:31-09:24;

00:01-05:32 (showing a conversation between Ellison and a Detective Forbes, but

not with Ofﬁcer Kingland)).

The ofﬁcers’ Videos
thing: the approximately

(Miles

OBV,

D.

how

show

that the ofﬁcer conversation at issue could only

20-second conversation that

00:10-00:30.)

could not determine

plainly

The

district court

is

be one

seen on Ofﬁcer Miles’s on-body Video.

accordingly Clearly erred

When

it

concluded

it

(E R., p.82.)

long that conversation lasted.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded Ofﬁcer Kingland Impermissiblv Extended
Or Abandoned The Trafﬁc Stop Prior T0 The K-9 Sniff
Pursuant t0 the Fourth

Amendment of the United

States Constitution “[t]he right 0f the

people t0 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and

seizures, shall not

be violated.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

A

police ofﬁcer

person for the purpose 0f investigating possible criminal behavior “if there
suspicion that the person has committed 0r

is

about t0 commit a crime.”

Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State
520, 522 (1992)).

Such a detention

Which justify suspicion

V.

“is permissible if

that the detained person

is,
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is

may

detain a

an articulable

State V. Wright, 134

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d

it is

based upon speciﬁc articulable

has been, 0r

is

facts

about t0 be engaged in criminal

State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.

activity.”

Tag v. Ohio, 392 U.s.

1,

21 (1968); United States

“Because a routine trafﬁc stop

more analogous

to

may

m,

Cortez, 449 U.s. 41

at

417 (1981)).

arrest

and therefore

is

it is

analyzed

S. Ct.

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

983, 88 P.3d at 1223. “Under the Fourth

Amendment, an ofﬁcer

set forth in

139 Idaho

1,

(citing

normally limited in scope and of short duration,

an investigative detention than a custodial

under the principles
(1968).”

is

v.

App. 2003)

Terry

v.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1,

88

stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible criminal behavior if there

articulable suspicion that the vehicle

is

is

a reasonable and

being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws.” State

V.

Roe, 140

Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004).

“An

investigative detention

effectuate the purpose 0f the stop.”

(Ct.

App. 2008).

longer than

is

must be temporary and

last

no longer than necessary

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261,

“Because addressing the infraction

the purpose 0f the stop,

is

necessary t0 effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez

V.

United

it

States,

may

exit 0r to

remain inside.”

may

1264

last

n0

575 U.S. 348,

354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (internal quotes, brackets and citations omitted).

matter of course in a valid trafﬁc stop, a police ofﬁcer

t0

“[A]s a

order the occupants of a vehicle to

State V. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 105, 137 P.3d 1024,

1027

(Ct.

App.

2006). “The stop remains a reasonable seizure While the ofﬁcer diligently pursues the purpose of

the stop, to

which

that reasonable suspicion is related.

However, should the ofﬁcer abandon the

purpose of the stop, the ofﬁcer n0 longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his
actions.” State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609,

The United

States

389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).

Supreme Court has held

that,

“[b]ey0nd determining whether t0 issue a

trafﬁc ticket, an ofﬁcer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident t0 [the trafﬁc] stop.’”

Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

at

355 (quoting

Illinois V. Caballes,
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543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). “Typically

such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”

Li.

“These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the trafﬁc code: ensuring that

vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Li.

The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed
Rodriguez and held that a trafﬁc

the United

stop, supported

Supreme Court holding

States

by reasonable

suspicion, “remains a reasonable

seizure While the ofﬁcer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to

suspicion

is

related.”

in

Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154.

which

that reasonable

But the Linze Court cautioned

that,

should the ofﬁcer abandon the purpose of the stop, the ofﬁcer n0 longer has that
original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed,

When an ofﬁcer

abandons his or her original purpose, the ofﬁcer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure With a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth

0n the reasonableness 0f the

Amendment. This new

seizure cannot piggy-back

a seized party’s Fourth

of the stop

is

some new
new purpose,

original seizure. In other words, unless

reasonable suspicion 0r probable cause arises t0 justify the seizure’s

Amendment

abandoned (unless

rights are violated

that

abandonment

when

falls

the original purpose

Within some established

exception).

Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154.

unreasonably prolongs a trafﬁc stop, the
before 0r after the trafﬁc ticket

is

In cases in

critical

issued, but

question

Which
is

it

is

alleged that a dog sniff

not whether the dog sniff occurs

whether the dog sniff adds time

t0 the trafﬁc stop.

Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154 (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616).

There
registration.

is

(R., p.75.)

trafﬁc citations.

Linze.

n0 dispute here

that Riley

was properly pulled over

for her expired vehicle

Moreover, the K-9 alerted While Ofﬁcer Kingland was writing Riley’s

(R., pp.78-79.)

McGraw, 163 Idaho

Thus, this case

is

already distinguishable from Rodriguez and

736, 740—41, 418 P.3d 1245, 1249—50 (Ct. App. 2018) (“Unlike

13

Rodriguez, the dog sniff in this case did not occur after the trafﬁc stop was complete;
during the trafﬁc stop. Thus, the dog sniff did not ‘add time’ t0 the stop in the

occurred, so

it

did not add time to the stop in the

factual differences,

Rodrigyez and

district court’s

Moreover, the
the trafﬁc stop”

added).)

By the

the ofﬁcers

by ﬁnishing writing

the

dog

sniff

sniff

Because of the

the sniff did in Linze.

are distinguishable.”)

repeated invocation that Ofﬁcer Kingland “aband0n[ed]

trafﬁc citations

is

irrelevant.

(emphasis

(R., pp.79, 81

time Ofﬁcer Kingland ﬁnished Riley’s citations the K-9 had already alerted and

had probable cause

P.3d 1146, 1148

m

way

occurred

way the dog

was not suspended While

did in Rodriguez. And, unlike Linze, the stop in this case

it

(Ct.

t0 search her car.

App. 2007) (“When a

State V.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172

reliable drug—detection

dog indicates

that a lawfully

stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the ofﬁcer has probable cause t0
believe that there are drugs in the automobile and

may

search

it

whether the trafﬁc stop was “abandoned” after the K—9 alerted

The only consequential question
prior to the K—9

sniff.

The

is

district court

is

Without a warrant”)

As

a result,

0f n0 moment.

Whether Ofﬁcer Kingland abandoned the trafﬁc stop

found two pre-alert points

at

Which Ofﬁcer Kingland

“measurably extended the duration of Ms. Riley’s seizure” by engaging in conversations “not
related t0 the purpose of the trafﬁc stop”: 1)
car”5

used

5

and 2) When he talked
illegal

The

to

“questions about items in her

Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison “about his suspicions that [Riley] had

drugs recently and about [the ofﬁcers] getting consent t0 search her car.” (R., p.84.)

district court’s analysis

was not

that the questions to Riley did not

conclusion,

When he asked Riley

it

entirely clear

this point; earlier in its order

measurably extend the

concluded that the questions

extend the duration” of the stop.

on

t0 Riley

(R., p.84.)

measurably extend the stop as explained herein.
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was a

stop.

(R., p.79.)

it

concluded

However,

in

its

“deviation[]” that did “measurably

In any event, the questions to Riley did not

This was an error.

Since Rodriguez and

M,

415 P.3d 954

State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545,

made

App. 2018);

(Ct.

4050018; McGraW, 163 Idaho 736, 418 P.3d 1245.

the Idaho Court of Appeals has clariﬁed

St_i11,

N0. 45792, 2019

WL

And, time and time again, the Court has

clear that “[c]ounting every pause taken while writing a citation as conduct that unlawfully

adds time to the stop

is

inimical t0 the Fourth

contrary to United States

McGraW, 163 Idaho

at

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and

Supreme Court precedent.”

St_i11,

No. 45792, 2019

is

WL 4050018 at *5;

741, 418 P.3d at 1250.

For example, in ReLeria, the Court 0f Appeals held that asking Renteria about drugs did
not extend the length 0f the stop because Renteria

during the questions.

163 Idaho

at 549,

415 P.3d

was

at 958.

Nor

when he made

the request for a drug-detection dog; the ofﬁcer

when he made

the request.

EQ

searching for proof 0f insurance

still

did the ofﬁcer extend the stop

was walking back

Finally, the ofﬁcer did not extend the stop

suspicions with Renteria because, at that point, dispatch had not responded.

The Court of Appeals arrived
stop, a

at

a similar conclusion in

drug dog alerted on the defendants’

car, the

McGraw.

to his patrol car

by discussing

his

gQ
There, during a trafﬁc

ofﬁcers found drugs, and the defendants were

charged with drug related crimes. McGraw, 163 Idaho

at

737-738, 418 P.3d

at

1246-1247. The

defendants ﬁled motions t0 suppress arguing, in part, that the ofﬁcers impermissibly extended the
length 0f the trafﬁc stop because one ofﬁcer “directed” a second ofﬁcer to issue a citation While

the ﬁrst ofﬁcer deployed his K-9.

EQ

at

738, 418 P.3d at 1247.

The

district court

granted the

defendants’ motion, holding that the ﬁrst ofﬁcer abandoned the purpose 0f the stop and

unlawfully extended the length of the stop.

Appeals reversed.

EQ

at

EQ

737, 418 P.3d at 1246.
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The

state appealed,

and the Idaho Court of

The Court 0f Appeals distinguished Rodriggez and Linze, explaining
the stop

was not abandoned simply because

it

that the

purpose 0f

took a few seconds to transfer the duties related to

the stop:

The

question, instead,

Whether the dog sniff occurred during the course of the

is

was unlawfully prolonged as a result 0f the sniff.
While it is clear that Ofﬁcer One was not pursuing the purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop
When he was conducting the dog sniff, it is equally clear that the purpose of the
stop was not abandoned because the duties related thereto, Which included the
trafﬁc stop 0r Whether the stop

Ofﬁcer Two before
distinguishable from Rodriguez and

issuance 0f a citation, were transferred from Ofﬁcer
the sniff occurred. For this reason, this case

Linze,

upon Which

418 P.3d

Li. at 740,

at

is

One

the district court relied.

1249.

The Court, denying suppression,

courts should not “count every pause” t0 determine whether a stop

We

t0

further explained

Why

district

was impermissibly extended:

n0 principled basis for holding, as a matter 0f Fourth Amendment law,
dog sniff would pass constitutional muster if only Ofﬁcer One would have
continued writing the citation instead 0f transferring that task to Ofﬁcer Two. We
also see n0 principled basis for holding that the Fourth Amendment precludes one
ofﬁcer from pursuing the purpose of a stop While providing cover t0 another
see

that the

ofﬁcer on-scene or for holding that the Fourth

Amendment

requires an ofﬁcer t0

“continuously” write a citation without ever pausing for any reason. If anything,
United States Supreme Court cases recognizing that inquiries unrelated to the

purpose 0f the stop d0 not convert the stop into an unlawful detention so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop support the

opposite conclusion.

Li. at 741,

418 P.3d

Most
prohibit

all

possible.”

stop,

at

1250.

recently, in State V. Still, the

conduct that in any

No. 45792, 2019

and While acquiring

way slows

at *5.

from completing the stop as

The ofﬁcer

fast as

initial

down, and took ten seconds

t0

humanly

there “engaged in a lawful trafﬁc

documentation, radioed t0 request a drug-dog unit.”

“After not receiving a response t0 his

vehicle, sat

the ofﬁcer

WL 4050018

Still’s

Court of Appeals reiterated that “Rodriguez does not

Li. at *4.

radio call,” the ofﬁcer “walked back t0 his patrol

make
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a second radio call to a drug-dog ofﬁcer.” Li.

The Court of Appeals found
drug-dog unit

if a

to

is

that the “sole question” before

available constitutes an

it

was “Whether a

radio call t0 inquire

abandonment of the trafﬁc mission so

as t0

amount

an unlawful extension 0f Still’s trafﬁc stop.” Li

The

Court “conclude[d] that a radio

Still

constitute a Rodriguez

abandonment,” and that the case before

“distinguishable from Rodriguez and Linze.”

making

Li. at *5.

the ten-second radio call, the ofﬁcer “did not

it,

drug dog

is

available does not

like Renteria

and McGraw, was

call to inquire if a

The Court

ﬁrst pointed out that,

abandon the purpose of the trafﬁc stop

by
to

engage in a separate criminal investigation.” Rodriggez and Linze, on the other hand, were cases
in

Which ofﬁcers “converted the trafﬁc stops

sniffs

unsupported by reasonable suspicion.”

The

Still

Court went on t0 explain

into drug investigations

by engaging

in

drug-dog

Li.

Why

the radio call did not rise to the level of a

Rodriguez abandonment:

Rodriguez does not prohibit

conduct that in any

all

way

slows the ofﬁcer from

humanly possible. It prohibits abandoning the stop
The Rodriguez Court took issue With the investigation
(i.e. the drug-dog sniff) itself. Here, Ofﬁcer Clark was not conducting a drug-dog
sniff, taking safety measures aimed at conducting a drug-dog sniff, or engaging in
any other alternate investigation. At most, a radio call t0 inquire if a drug-dog
completing the stop as

fast as

to investigate other crimes.

available

unit

is

may

(or

may

is

a precursor

t0

an alternate investigation. Although the

call

which may 0r may not pass
does not amount t0 a Fourth Amendment

not) result in an alternate investigation

constitutional muster, the call itself
Violation.

Li.

(emphasis added).

The Court 0f Appeals,
abandonment

inquiry,

stressing that reasonableness is at the heart 0f a

afﬁrmed the

district court’s denial

Rodriggez

of suppression:

We cannot conclude that any pause during a trafﬁc stop requires a conclusion
under Rodriguez and Linze that the ofﬁcers abandoned the purpose 0f the trafﬁc
stop.

In

fact,

such a conclusion

reasonableness requirement and

is

is

inimical

t0

the

Fourth Amendment’s

contrary t0 United States

17

Supreme Court

n0 Fourth Amendment Violation occurred,
comports with Rodriguez, Linze, and this Court’s previous precedent, and gives
meaning t0 the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in denying Still’s motion t0 suppress.

precedent.

Our conclusion,

Li. (internal citations

those

cases

and footnotes omitted).

McGraW, and

Renteria,

neither

that

Still

control the

outcome

Ofﬁcer Kingland’s questions

Under

here.

to

Riley,

the standards set forth in

nor the ofﬁcer conversation,

impermissibly extended the trafﬁc stop 0r constituted a Rodrigjgez abandonment.

As

for

0f Appeals

Ofﬁcer Kingland’s 8-seconds 0f questions
has

already

held

that,

while

“inquiries

methamphetamine and open containers of alcohol”

Court

t0 Riley about illegal drugs, the

about

presence

the

0f marijuana,

are “unrelated t0 the subject matter” of a

m

trafﬁc stop, “such brief, general questioning, in and 0f itself,” does not “extend the scope of

detention beyond that necessary to effectuate the purposes of a legitimate trafﬁc stop.”

Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000).

Ren_teria,

w,

and Rodriggez

itself that

at

549, 415 P.3d at 958;

609, 389 P.3d at 154, n.1; Rodriggez, 575 U.S. at 357. That

Ofﬁcer Kingland wrote Riley’s identifying information

if

they occur

M,

161 Idaho

was exactly What happened

in his notebook,

the notebook in his pocket, he asked her about illegal drugs.

04:1

we know from

even scope-exceeding actions are proper

concurrently With the trafﬁc stop. ReLeria, 163 Idaho

at

Moreover,

(R., p.76;

here:

and as he was putting
Kingland

OBV,

04:03-

So even assuming the questions were beyond the scope 0f the trafﬁc stop they did not

1.)

add time

to

The

it.

district court disagreed,

the ofﬁcer t0 put his

ﬁnding

that there

pad away before he walked back

“was no evidence

it

was necessary

t0 the car.” (R., p.78.) In the court’s

Ofﬁcer Kingland “could have simply turned and walked back

18

that

for

View

t0 his car without putting his

notebook away,” and, as such, the court found “the ofﬁcer was not simultaneously completing

some

other task related to the trafﬁc stop.” (Id.)

This

is

the height of pause-counting.

The Fourth Amendment does not

ofﬁcer must march back to his car While holding his notebook

aloft, like

require that an

an Olympic torch, to

keep a lawful trafﬁc stop from ﬂipping over into an unlawful drug investigation.

And

simply

because the ofﬁcer could have kept a death grip 0n his notebook through the duration 0f the
trafﬁc stop does not

mean he

reasonably should have.

It is

reasonable trafﬁc stop for an ofﬁcer t0 put his notebook

otherwise, the ofﬁcer

would need

t0

obviously Within the scope of a

away and

free

up

his other hand;

hold his notebook and hold the citation book and type the

information into dispatch. Unless the ofﬁcer has three hands this would only take more time to

ﬁnish the
stop

is

bound

precisely

St_i11,

These

citation.

2019

exemplify

why nitpicking

every incidental action during a trafﬁc

be “inimical t0 the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”—

t0

Why the

facts

Court 0f Appeals has repeatedly

WL 4050018

away a notebook

is

at *5;

such an unforgiving

mode of analysis.

741, 418 P.3d at 1250.

Because putting

rej ected

McGraW, 163 Idaho

at

self—evidently within the scope of a trafﬁc stop, the ofﬁcer did not

impermissibly extend the stop by asking Riley about

illegal

items while putting his notebook

away.
Likewise, the conversation between the ofﬁcers did not impermissibly extend the stop.

For about 20 seconds, Ofﬁcer Kingland stopped writing trafﬁc citations
Miles and Ellison,

Who had

it

speak with Ofﬁcers

just arrived, to explain his “concerns with respect t0 [Riley’s]

potential drug use.” (TL, p.22, Ls.8-23; Miles

explained that

t0

was “important

to

inform

OBV,

my

00:10 — 00:30.) Ofﬁcer Kingland correctly

approaching ofﬁcers for ofﬁcer safety purposes

What’s going 0n and what they’re walking into and not walk into there blindly.”
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(TL, p.22,

Ls.12-15.)

This was not an extension of the trafﬁc stop, insofar as “Highway and ofﬁcer safety

are interests different in kind

trafﬁcking in particular.”

from the Government’s endeavor

Rodriggez, 575 U.S.

to detect crime in general 0r drug

Thus, “an ofﬁcer

at 357.

may

take certain

precautions to ensure ofﬁcer safety because ‘the government’s ofﬁcer safety interest stems from

McGraW, 163 Idaho

the mission 0f the stop itself.”’

Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

at 356).

detours” such as

facilitate

And
K-9

while

sniffs

it

walking

into.

It is

742, 418 P.3d at 1251 (quoting

true that “safety precautions taken in order t0

is

add time

does not “facilitate” an investigative detour t0

at

t0 a stop

alert

(ﬂ Rodriggez,

As

Who

t0 the

or What they might

t0 a vehicle, without

any

second part 0f the ofﬁcer conversation, Ofﬁcer Kingland testiﬁed that he asked

mere brief request

try t0 get” Riley’s “consent to search” her vehicle.

for consent t0 a search during or at the conclusion

187 P.3d 1261, 1266

(Ct.

App. 2008)

in the afﬁrmative

was

that “[a]

of an otherwise valid

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 891,

(citing State V. Silva,

App. 2000) (“The additional second or two

which Silva replied

(TL, p.25, L.22

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals has already held

detention does not impermissibly extend a trafﬁc stop.”

(Ct.

up

ﬁnd there.

This was likewise proper.

p.26, L.1.)

it

simply a reasonable safety precaution—for both the arriving ofﬁcers and the

Ofﬁcers Miles and Ellison “t0

—

at 356),

newly—arriving ofﬁcers as t0 What they are

individual in the vehicle—to not require ofﬁcers t0 blindly rush

heads—up as to

575 U.S.

134 Idaho 848, 853, 11 P.3d 44, 49

that [the ofﬁcer] took to ask for consent

objectively reasonable.”)).

and

in

If a brief request for

consent does not impermissibly extend a trafﬁc stop then a brief conversation about seeking

consent would not impermissibly extend

Moreover, the
is

occurring,

,9

‘6

St_i11

it

either.

Court, examining “a situation in which nothing but

squarely address[ed] the constitutionality of

20

[a]

[a]

ten—second

call

radio call t0 inquire if a drug-dog

unit

2019

available.”

is

second

4050018

sniff,

sniff,

the Court there explained that the 10-

taking safety measures aimed at conducting a

0r engaging in any other alternate investigation”:

At most, a radio

call to inquire if a

investigation

drug-dog unit

Although the

alternate investigation.

may

call

which may 0r may not pass

not amount to a Fourth

Li. at

And

at *5, n.3.

was “not conducting a drug-dog

call

drug-dog

WL

is

(0r

available

may

is

a precursor to an

not) result in an alternate

constitutional muster, the call itself does

Amendment Violation.

*5 (emphasis added).
This

is

what the other half 0f the ofﬁcer conversation was.

precisely

asked the other ofﬁcers to obtain Riley’s consent t0 search her
safety

measure aimed

was a precursor

t0

conducting a K-9

sniff,

This was not a K—9

may

0r

may not have

sniff,

At most,

0r itself an alternate investigation.

an alternate investigation, Which

a

it

led t0 a consent-based

We know from St_i11 that this alone did not impermissibly extend the stop.

search 0f Riley’s car.

T0 ﬁnd

at

car.

Ofﬁcer Kingland

that the

20-second long ofﬁcer conversation impermissibly extended the trafﬁc

stop requires concluding “that the Fourth

Amendment

requires an ofﬁcer to ‘continuously’ write

a citation without ever pausing for any reason,” Which the Court of Appeals has rejected.

McGraW, 163 Idaho

at

741, 418 P.3d at 1250.

from McGraW, but appeared
court,

lumping

concluded

it

in the

to

The

district court

simply decide not to follow

had “to follow the

rule in Rodriguez“ as

(R., pp.109-10.)

it.

Court of Appeals with an Idaho federal

opposed

acknowledged

district court,

to the “valid

this

holding

The

explained

state argues that

it

is

absurd that this court must engage in the parsing of

seconds during a trafﬁc stop t0 determine

if the duration

0f the entire stop was

extended by those seconds. The State cites t0 a decision by Chief Judge Winmill
which Chief Judge Winmill articulately expresses some of the difﬁculties for

in

trial

courts,

Rodriguez,

if

and the seeming unreasonableness of the rule announced
taken t0

its

logical extreme.
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The

why

it

criticism[]” in

McGraw:
The

district

in

State similarly cites this court t0 a

decision
critical

by the Idaho Court of Appeals

in

Which two of the judges appeared

to

be

0f that portion of the holding in Rodriguez that rejected the Eighth

Circuit’s de [minimis] rule, 0r t0 be at least critical of the idea that the trial courts

Who have

such motions must “count every pause taken While writing a

to decide

See State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 741, 418 P.3d 1245, 1250 (Ct.
App. 2018). However valid those criticisms may be, this court is bound to follow
the rule announced in Rodriguez.
citation.”

(R., p.84.)

This was fundamentally mistaken. The Idaho Court 0f Appeals
district court

not a sister—jurisdiction

churning out “criticisms” to be taken under advisement. “[A]ll tribunals inferior to

the Court 0f Appeals are obligated to abide

V.

is

Mann, 162 Idaho

by decisions issued by

394 P.3d 79, 85 (2017)

36, 42,

842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992)). Idaho

district courts are therefore

Court and Idaho Court 0f Appeals decisions, and
parsing of the former.

Of

(citing State V.

course, the Idaho

the Court of Appeals.”

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986,

bound by United

may not jettison

V.

States

Supreme

the latter in light of their

Supreme Court and United

have the ﬁnal say 0n the law that will bind lower courts. State

State

States

own

Supreme Court

Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 505,

363 P.3d 339, 346 (2015) (“[W]e simply expect lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, t0
follow decisions of this Court

When

there

a conﬂict between our decisions on an issue of law

is

and those of the Court of Appeals.”). But Idaho
Court of Appeals’ decisions based 0n their

would upend

stare decisis,

and would give

court precedent in light 0f their

The

district court

is

is

0f

To allow otherwise

blanche to ignore binding

McGraw. Those

district court,

cases,

“inimical to the Fourth

contrary t0 United State

t0 opt out

state-

federal law.

below, like every Idaho

every pause 0f a trafﬁc stop

d0 not simply get

interpretation 0f federal law.

district courts carte

own takes 0n

Appeals’ decisions in Renteria and

and

own

district courts

and

now

St_i11,

make

it

the Court 0f

clear:

counting

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement

Supreme Court precedent.”

22

was bound by

St_i11,

2019

WL

4050018,

at *5;

McGraW, 163 Idaho

at

741, 418 P.3d at 1250. Here, neither the questions t0 Riley nor the ofﬁcer

nor the ofﬁcer conversation impermissibly extended the trafﬁc stop.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court reverse the

district court’s

order granting Riley’s

suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.

DATED this 30th day 0f March,

2020.
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